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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF THE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT ON INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: THREE ESSAYS
JUN WU, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010
Dissertation Directed by:
Professors Shaomin Li, David D. Selover and George O. White III
Department of Management
College of Business & Public Administration
We examine how governance environment affects business activities across countries.
Using an updated framework of governance environments, we classify countries into
three groups based on their dominant modes of governance: (1) rule-based (strong rule of
law), (2) relation-based (weak rule of law and strong informal network based on private
relations), and (3) neither-based (absence of both public rules and private network). We
then examine how different governance types affect trade patterns and foreign investment
flows. Chapter 2 theoretically proposes that the governance environment of a society
plays a significant role in influencing international trade and foreign investment across
countries. Chapter 3 examines how different governance types affect trade patterns
among 44 countries. Overall, we find that rule-based countries trade more than relationbased or neither-based countries. A large positive effect on trade flows exists between
two highly rule-based countries and between two relation-based countries. Any trade
relationship involving a neither-based country negatively affects trade flows, even
between two neither-based countries. In Chapter 4, we examine how different governance
types affect foreign investment flows among 44 countries. We find that rule-based

countries attract the lowest amount of FDI relative to total amount of foreign investment,
and they have the largest stock market size relative to their economies.
This thesis is among the first to introduce the third category of governance—
neither-based governance. This advancement will contribute to both the institution and
political economy literature. Using the updated framework of governance to explore trade
and foreign investment patterns of many countries, especially of those relatively
undeveloped countries, will contribute the international business literature. In addition to
academic contributions, this study provides important policy implications to those
neither-based countries. We suggest that in considering trade and foreign investment
policies, governments should pay close attention to the governance environments to
evaluate their own and their partners' situations when conducting international business
such as trade and foreign investment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Since the 1990s, more and more scholars have come to realize that institutions
matter (North, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutions are "the rules
of game in a society" (North, 1990: 3). Institutional environments include cognitive,
normative, and regulatory structures and activities which provide stability and meaning to
social behavior in a particular society (Delios, Xu and Beamish, 2005; Scott, 1995; Wan
and Hoskisson, 2003; White, 2006; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Institution is a broad and
complicated concept. Shuhe Li and his colleagues (Shuhe Li, 1999; Shaomin Li, Park,
and Shuhe Li, 2004) proposed a relatively concise and powerful typology of institutional
governance environment—the two-category framework of governance environments
(rule-based versus relation-based). However, it is too simple to categorize all governance
into these two categories. This two-category framework is far enough to cover all
countries (Shaomin Li, 2009).

Some countries have neither effective public ordering nor extensive social network.
They cannot be categorized into neither rule-based nor relation-based governance.
Therefore, it is called neither-based1 governance (Li, 2009). This dissertation builds on Li
(2009) to expand the three-category framework of governance environments. We take
use of institutional theory and transaction cost perspectives to interpret the theoretical
logic of different governance and the role of extended particularized trust, which is the
differentiator of relation-based and neither-based governance.

Since the 1990s, scholars have come to realize that institutions play an important
role in many perspectives, including international business (Ederington, Levinson and
1

We will explain it in more detail in a later chapter and we use it with "family-based" interchangeably.
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Minier, 2005), industry structure (Li et al, 2004), organizational changes (Greenwood and
Hinings, 1996), strategies (Peng, 2003), and organization structures (Judge and Li, 2008).
We are very interested in the influence of institutions on international business. On one
side, this new third-category governance (neither-based) includes the largest number of
countries and many relatively undeveloped countries belong to this group (Li, 2009).
These relatively undeveloped countries will benefit a lot from international business. On
the other side, there are many countries, mostly, neither-based countries, which do not
conduct international business as much as rule-based and relation-based countries do.
For example, on average, neither-based countries trade less than one quarter of what rulebased countries trade2. Why does this happen? Therefore, this dissertation is to explore
how institutional governance environments, especially, rule-based, relation-based and
neither-based governance, affect international business such as international trade and
foreign investment patterns.

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 theoretically
introduces this three-category governance framework and proposes its influence on
international trade and foreign investment. Chapter 3 empirically examines why some
countries trade more, some trade less, and some trade almost nothing, and empirically
examines how the three-category governance framework affects international trade.
Similarly, we empirically examine how three-category framework explains differences in
foreign investment across countries in Chapter 4.

2

Please see Table 3 for more detail.
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Chapter 2: Effects of Governance Environments on International Trade and
Foreign Investment: A Contingency Perspective Based on Particularized Trust
2.1 Introduction
Institutions are "the rules of game in a society or, more formally, are humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction", according to North (1990:3).
Institutional theory has demonstrated its power to predict organizational changes
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), organizational strategies (Peng, 2003), the co-evolution
of organizations and organizational fields (Hoffman, 1999) and also international
business activities, such as international trade flows (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002;
Koukhartchouk and Maurel, 2003; De Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian, 2004;
Ederington, Levinson and Minier, 2005) and foreign investment patterns ( Fatehi and
Safizadeh, 1989; Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova, 1998; Hejazi and Safarian, 2002;
Henisz, 2000; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Loree and Guisinger, 1995;
Wei, 2000). However, there is relatively more literature focusing on the effects of
"formal institutions" namely, governmental institutions (laws and regulations), compared
with literature on informal and social institutions, such as the information infrastructure,
public trust and business professional institutions (e.g., accounting standards) (Shaomin
Li and Filer, 2007).

The governance environment is conceptualized as the "macro social, political,
legal and economic institutions that shape and constrain micro governance behavior in
social, political, and economic exchanges" (Li and Filer, 2007: 82-83). It is a concept
implied in North's (1990) institutional theory and includes both formal and informal
social rules. A relatively concise but powerful typology of institutional governance
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systems is the two-category framework of governance environments (rule-based versus
relation-based), first proposed by Shuhe Li and later on expanded upon by others (Shuhe
Li, 1999; Shaomin Li, Park, and Shuhe Li, 2004). When public ordering is effective and
efficient, people reply on public ordering to protect their interests in social exchanges,
this mechanism is called rule-based governance. By contrast, when public ordering is
lacking and the enforcement of laws and regulations is not very efficient, people reply on
extended social networks to protect their interests, which is called relation-based
governance. However, this framework receives criticism from scholars. As Shaomin Li
(2009) later acknowledges, the two categories are far from sufficient to cover all the
countries in the world. What this framework left unexamined is that there are many
countries that have neither effective public ordering nor extensive informal social
networks. Li (2009) interacted non-rule-based governance (societies without public
ordering) with particularized trust (described in detail in a later section) and advanced a
third category—neither-based governance (described in detail in a later section). For
instance, according to Li's (2009) new classification, Argentina, Brazil and Russia are
neither highly rule-based nor highly relation-based. They belong to "neither-based"
societies.

Li's (2009) interaction is very novel and creative. It gives rise to a new category
of governance environment—neither-based. However, he did not explain the theoretical
background of this interaction. This paper builds on his classification and tries to interpret
the theoretical logic of his interaction, using institutional theory and transaction cost
economies. In societies without effective public ordering, extended particularized trust,
which knits people into intensive social networks, in fact, plays the role of institution and
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fills the "institutional voids". Extended particularized trust, on the other hand, reduces the
transaction costs among economic transactions.
Since this three-category governance framework is new, it gives rise to another
gap in literature—how does the interaction of governance environment and particularized
trust affect international trade and foreign investment? Or, in other words, how do rulebased, relation-based and neither-based governance affect international trade and foreign
investment?
This paper will take use of institutional theory and transaction cost economies to
explain the interaction of non-rule-based governance with particularized trust. By doing
this, this study will contribute to the governance literature with a new category of
governance. In addition, it will apply this new category of governance environment to
explain international trade patterns and foreign investment flows. Therefore, this paper
will add itself into literature focusing on the quality of both formal and informal
institutions and also literature in explaining the different patterns of foreign trade and
investment.
2.2 A Framework of Governance Environments
2.2.1 Three-category Framework of Governance Environments
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it
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becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of
settling disputes, but will look for a private method. This institutional environment is
referred to as governance environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social
institutions that together facilitates or constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in
a society (Li and Filer, 2007). Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or
norms. The institutional or governance environment includes institutions, organizations,
and the resulting enforcement characteristics. Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a
framework that classifies the governance environment across countries into two
categories—rule-based and relation-based—in terms of how people protect their property
rights and contracts.

Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies,
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and ruleenforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the
legal infrastructures, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and
powerful enforcement branch, which is costly and takes a long time to build. This
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North
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1990, 2005). According to Li (2009), countries such as Finland, Sweden and the United
States are examples of rule-based societies (shown in Table 1).
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society has
the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and government
regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the legislative,
judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are controlled by
the ruler(s); and public information is controlled by the state and is untrustworthy.
Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that there exist closely knit
informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections to protect themselves
and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and governed by wellfunctioning social networks maintained by private players, the relation-based governance
system incurs few fixed costs compared to the high fixed-cost structure of the rule-based
system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to lessen potential
prosperity by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange, and to restrict
impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). According to Li (2009), some good examples
of relation-based societies are China, Indonesia and Vietnam (shown in Table 1).

Neither-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the traditional
framework by introducing a third category of governance environment—neither-based,
also called family-based (in this study, we use them interchangeably). He argued that a
country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there are
some countries that have neither strong public rules, nor extensive informal social
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networks to conduct and protect business. According to Li (2009), some examples of
neither-based countries are India, Argentina and Russia (see Table 1).
2.2.2 Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust
Li (2009) identifies an important factor that distinguishes relation-based from
neither-based societies—the dominant type of particularized trust. Broadly speaking,
there are two types of trust in terms of who people trust: generalized trust and
particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002, 2004). People who hold generalized trust believe that
most people, including strangers, can be trusted. When people have very little confidence
or faith in strangers, they rely on people whom they know well, such as family members
or close friends. Such a trust is called particularized trust. The level of particularized
trust people place on different relationships varies. The closest is among the direct
members of the family—spouse, parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins,
and other close kinship may be the next circle. The third circle usually includes friends,
neighbors and co-workers.

Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors,
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. Such countries having
a relatively high level of extended particularized trust are relation-based. In contrast,
societies with extremely low levels of trust, where people predominantly rely on family
members to conduct business and to protect property rights, are referred to as neitherbased (family-based) societies. This environment is expected to lessen potential
prosperity the most by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange and to be the
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most restrictive for impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). The typology of
governance environment is shown in Figure 1.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
2.2.3 The Institutional and Transaction Cost Perspective of Governance System
Institutions include both formal and informal constraints (North, 1990). Formal
constraints include political rules, judicial decisions, and economic contracts. By contrast,
informal constraints include socially sanctioned norms of behavior, which are embedded
in culture and ideology (Scott, 1995). In situations where formal constraints fail, informal
constrains will come into play the role to reduce uncertainty and provide constancy to
organizations (North, 1990).
Rule-based societies are in situation when formal constraints work. The public
ordering is effective and the enforcement is efficient. In contrast with "rule-based", we
can call societies when formal constraints fail "non-rule-based". In some non-rule-based
societies, personal relations come into play the role of institutions, for example, guanxi in
China (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Guanxi works as a substitute for formal institutional
support (Xin and Pearce, 1996) and is useful in "the regulation of transactions in the
absence of state institutions for that purpose" (Redding, 1990, p. 56). This idea is hardly
new and has been tested a lot (Boisot, 1986; Coleman, 1993; Fallers, 1965; Putname,
1993; Riggs, 1964; Walder, 1986; Xin and Pearce, 1996).

As Li (2009) stated, the strong guanxi culture comes from the extended
particularized trust. Take China as an example, everyone must have his or her circle of
close friends to survive. The members of circles help each other in social interactions and
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exchanges. In each circle, people know each other very well. The Chinese society can be
viewed as consisting of numerous circles. Resource people are the ones who belong to
multiple circles. Because of highly particularized trust, members in one group will trust
people from another group if they are introduced by these resource people. Through this
powerful introduction, one member begins to know people from another circle, and then
more circles are linked together and become a broader network. This network plays the
role of institution in non-rule-based societies.
The cost structures of rule-based and relation-based governance systems are
different (Shuhe Li, 1999; Li et al., 2004; Shaomin Li, 2009), which is shown in Figure 2.
Basically, these scholars agreed that a well functioning rule-based system requires a large
investment (high fixed cost) in the legal infrastructures. Once the infrastructure is built
and functioning, the incremental cost to make another transaction is minimal (low
marginal cost). By contrast, in a relation-based society, business can thrive with minimal
social order (low fixed cost). However, with business expands, the extra cost to make
another transaction increases (high marginal cost).
From a transaction cost perspective, the rule-based system works well when the
scale of economy is large, while relation-based governance works best when the
economic scale is small. In neither-based societies, formal institutional is missing and
there is no extended particularized trust playing the role of institution. People reply on
only their nuclear family members to do business, which leads to difficulty in expanding
business. The business scale is very limited and the transaction cost is high (as shown in
Figure 3).
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[Please insert Figure 2 and 3 about here]
2.3 Literature Review
Recently, as the use of the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to examine
social, economic, and business behavior increases, scholars in international business
begin to examine how institutional quality affects international business, such as
international trade and foreign investment.
On the side of international trade, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have been
among the main contributors to extend governance environment to international trade.
They examine how enforcement of the legal system affects import demands. They
present evidence that corruption and poor contract enforcement in a country increases the
insecurity of selling to that country, thereby reducing international trade. Koukhartchouk
and Maurel (2003) introduce variables reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of
potential trade effects for Central and Eastern European countries. De Groot, Linders,
Rietveld and Subramanian (2004) adopt a comprehensive dataset developed by Kaufman,
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which includes the data sources used by Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) and Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003). De Groot et al. (2004)
capture the country-specific effect of governance on trade and also examine the bilateral
influence of governance similarity on patterns of trade. Li and Samsell (2009) adopt a
framework of governance environment and characterize these environments (institutional
matrixes) into rule-based and relation-based. They examine the effect of rule-based and
relation-based governance environments on international trade flows.
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Scholars have also begun to pay increasing attention to the macro environment in
a society and to its effect on investment. One of the main focuses is on how different
governance environments, such as the legal system, affect the willingness of investors to
invest and how investments are protected. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) found that countries with better legal systems tend to have a small number
and diversified investors. English and Moore (2002) found that when a firm announced
its investment in a country with ambiguous property rights, its stock value actually was
affected negatively. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found that governance
infrastructure—including the nature of the legal system— is an important determinant of
FDI. Specifically, countries with a more impartial and transparent legal system and better
protection of property rights tend to attract more FDI; countries lacking a good legal
system and adequate protection of property rights attract less FDI. Li and Filer (2007) are
among the first to examine the effect of governance environments on the variation of FDI
and FPI (Foreign Portfolio Investment). They used a relatively new framework of
governance environment, rule-based and relation-based and found that in countries with a
weak rule-based governance environment, investors prefer direct investment to indirect
investment, because the former can be better protected by private means.

These studies provide valuable insights into the powerful influence of the quality
of a country's institutions on international trade or foreign investment. However, they
focus on formal institutions and ignore the influence of "informal rules". Furthermore,
these studies do not distinguish between institutional environments that promote trade
and foreign investment and those that do not. Based on this argument, this paper will use
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the latest three-category framework of governance environments to analyze difference in
trade and foreign investment across countries.
Besides, this three-category framework is advanced by interacting particularized
trust with non-rule-based governance. Since extended or nuclear particularized trust is the
differentiator of relation-based and neither-based societies, trust will come to play roles
in international trade and foreign investment. In fact, there is a very few studies exploring
the role of trust in international business. Bhardwaj, Dietz and Beamish (2007) are among
the first. They argued that higher levels of trust facilitates relationships and reduces
perceptions of transaction costs and thereby attracts FDI. Thus, countries with higher
levels of trust should attract more inward FDI. However, their empirical results did not
support this statement. The main reason of their failure is that they did not distinguish
between generalized trust and particularized trust, or in the other words, trust most people
or trust only those one know well. "Interpersonal trust" they argued, in fact, is
particularized trust. However, they used generalized trust level of a country to make their
empirical analysis. Our paper distinguishes generalized trust and particularized trust. We
believe that it is generalized trust differentiating relation-based and neither-based
societies and we also argue that extended particularized trust will reduce transaction costs
of a society, and therefore plays a role in international trade and foreign investment.
2.4 Theory and Propositions
2.4.1 Entry barriers for outsiders
Firms selling goods to a foreign country face many barriers, including tariffs,
quotas, restrictive laws and regulations, and other informal constraints (Hill, 2005). As
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we stated in the former section, in rule-based societies, the trade laws and regulations are
relatively clear, effective, and universally applied. Both outsiders and insiders are subject
to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or permits. Both them
can acquire this information from public channels and sources.
By contrast, the situation in non-rule-based societies will be greatly different. In
non-rule-based societies, the public ordering is less clear and less fair and the
enforcement tends to be corrupt and inefficient. Given institutions as "the rules of the
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction" (North, 1990: 3), and institutional framework as "the set of
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that established the basis of
production, exchange, and distribution", lacking of public ordering is called "the
institutional voids" by Khanna and Palepu (1997).
In relation-based societies, or societies with extended particularized trust, people
trust not only their family members, but also their neighbors, friends and friends' friends.
For instance, Tang (2005) found that the most important trust sources of Chinese are
neighbors and friends, rather than only one's own family. In China, the guanxi culture is
very strong. Everyone must have his or her circle of close friends. Extend particularized
trust knit different circles into an informal social network (Li and Wu, 2010). People
reply on this extended informal social network to conduct social interactions and
exchanges. This informal social network plays the role to fill the institutional voids.

Insiders have extended particularized trust with each other and tightly knit with
each other through informal networks. These networks are very powerful. If one person
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cheats another one in his/her circle, he/she will be kicked out from this circle and
furthermore from the entire network. This strong deterrence will ensure that he/she will
not cheat. Because the "behavioral repertoires (in high trust societies) are based towards
cooperation, rather than opportunism" (Hill 1990: 511), trust play the ex-ante role to
reduce the opportunism (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). In addition, trust also enhances expost efficiency (Arrow, 1974; Ouchi, 1981; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997) by lowering costs, such as monitoring cost and costs due to opportunistic
behavior by agencies.
On the other side, outsiders are totally different from both institutional and
transaction cost perspectives. For outsiders, they still face the situation institutional voids.
They have nothing to rely on to conduct their business and protect their property rights.
Because they are out of contact from any circle or network, they cannot get trust from
insiders. As a result, they face higher transaction cost such as monitoring costs and costs
due to opportunist behavior.
Neither-based societies, according to Li (2009), are those societies lacking of both
effective public orderings and extended particularized trust. Because of lacking effective
public ordering, neither-based societies are also in the situation of institutional voids.
People tend to trust their family members only to conduct business transactions and
protect their interests. Insiders will be limited to a small group of family members.
If foreign countries who want to trade with focal countries, is just like outsiders
want to do business with the insiders. In rule-based societies, the trade laws and
regulations are relatively clear, effective, and universally applied. Both outsiders and

16
insiders are subject to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or
permits. In relation-based countries, laws and regulations regarding trade are opaque and
applied differently depending on the relationship of the prospective trader within the
authorities. Outsiders find it is difficult to break in because developing relationships are
costly. Even worse, neither-based societies are more restrictive than relation-based
because the economic cooperation is limited to family members only.
From a transaction cost perspective, rule-based governance works best when the
economic scale is large while relation-based governance works best when the economic
scale is small (shown in Figure 3). Thus, it will be easier to sell to rule-based than to
relation-based governance societies. With extended particularized trust, relations are
based towards cooperation, rather than opportunism. Trust is associated with expectations
of reduced opportunism by others (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Perceptions of monitoring
costs are likely lower in societies with extended particularized trust than societies with
nuclear particularized trust (Bhardwaj, Dietz and Beamish, 2007).
Based on these arguments, we argue that:
PI: It is the least difficult (least costly) to trade with rule-based countries. .
P2: It is the most difficult (most costly) to trade with non-rule-based countries
without extended particularized trust (neither-based countries).
2.4.2 Protection types outsiders may resort to: FDI vs. FPI
As we stated in a former section, direct investment allows an investor to govern
his/her own assets and thus direct investment is easier for investors to protect than
portfolio investment. Rule-based societies have well-established information
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infrastructure, fair and efficient public ordering and effective enforcement systems. If
only from the perspective of protection, there is no difference between direct investment
and portfolio investment to foreign investors.
Non-rule-based societies (both relation-based and neither-based societies) are in
the situation of institutional voids. Foreign investors do not have fair public ordering,
transparent information infrastructure and effective enforcement systems to rely on and
protect their investment. From institutional theory, investors make investment into nonrule-based countries will be more likely to choose direct investment.
In fact, Bhardwa, Dietz and Beamish (2007) argued that there is positive
relationship between FDI and trust level in a country. They argued that trust leads to
"spontaneous sociability" (Fukuyama, 1995: 29) and enables individuals and firms to
form cooperative relationships. Spontaneous sociality also enhances the speed of
relationship formation and reduces the opportunism. Furthermore, because of high trust,
the perception of monitoring costs is likely lower. In addition to providing ex-ante
attractions to foreign investors, trust also enhances the ex-post efficiency by lowering
monitoring cost and costs due to opportunist behavior. The trust they proposed, in fact, is
particularized trust3. Follow them, we believe that highly particularized trust can enable
spontaneous sociability, enhance relationship formation and reduce opportunism, and
thus trust can low monitoring cost. Therefore, we argue that when foreign investors make
investment to societies with extend particularized trust (relation-based societies) they are
more likely to choose FDI.

3
They did not distinguish particularized trust and generalized trust. The trust they proposed, in fact, is
particularized trust. But they use generalized trust to measure it, which is one of the reasons that their
statement is supported only partially.
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One of the reasons that the argument of Bhardwa et al. (2007) is only partially
supported is because they did not distinguish different types of countries. As we argued
in the former paragraph, countries with extended particularized trust will attract FDI.
However, in neither-based governance, the particularized trust level is very low, but
because of institutional voids, foreign investors are more likely to choose foreign direct
investment to protect their investment. In other words, in neither-based countries, the
particularized trust is low, but the FDI ratio is high. Therefore, there is a negative
relationship between trust level and relatively FDI ratio in some countries (neither-based
countries), which is opposite to their argument. In fact, different from relation-based
countries, where particularized trust comes to play the role of institution, neither-based
countries are in absolutely institution voids. When investors make investment into
neither-based countries, they are more likely to choose FDI to take their investment under
control and furthermore providing protection, compared to when they make investment
into relation-based countries. Based on these arguments, we would like to propose that:

P3: It is the most likely for foreign investors to choose foreign direct investment when
they invest into non-rule-based countries without extended particularized trust
(neither-based countries).
P4: It is the least likely for foreign investors to choose foreign direct investment when
they invest into rule-based countries.
A summary of our theoretical propositions is located in Table 2 and the
theoretical framework can be seen from Figure 4.
[Please insert Table 2 and Figure 4 about here]
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
This study applies a framework of governance environments to explain
differences in international trade and foreign investment across countries. Institutional
theory plays an important role in predicting industrial and corporate practices (e.g.
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; Peng, 2003). A relatively concise but
powerful typology of institutional governance systems in institutional and political
economy literature is a dichotomy between rule-based and relation-based governance.
However, this dichotomy leaves some countries unexamined (Li, 2009). Li (2009)
interacted non-rule-based governance with extended particularized trust and advanced a
third category of governance—neither-based. This paper interprets this governance from
transaction cost and institutional perspectives and introduces its difference from rulebased and relation-based societies. In relation-based societies, extended particularized
trust knit people into thick social network which plays the role of institution. Because of
extended particularized trust, relations are based on cooperation, rather than opportunism
which also reduce transaction costs. Neither-based societies lack of extended
particularized trust, therefore transaction costs will be higher.

Besides, this paper applies this three-category governance environment
framework to explain differences in international trade and foreign investment and puts
forward four propositions. Basically, we argue that rule-based societies are the easiest to
enter for outsiders (making international trade), relation-based societies are the next
easiest, and neither-based societies are the most difficult to enter. Similarly, foreign
investors are most likely to choose foreign direct investment when they invest in neither-
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based societies and are least likely to choose foreign direct investment when they invest
into rule-based societies, compared to when they invest into relation-based societies.
This paper is among the first to introduce this third category of governance—
neither-based governance. This advancement will contribute to the institution and
political economy literature. Present literatures ignore neither-based societies or mix
neither-based societies with relation-based societies. In fact, there are a large number of
countries which have neither efficient public ordering nor a thick social network. To a
large extent, most of these countries are relatively less developed and are in greatest need
to promote their international trade and attract foreign investment.
This study provides important policy implications for those neither-based
countries, in addition to the contributions to the literature. We suggest that when making
international trade, in considering trade policies, governments should pay close attention
to the governance environments to evaluate their own and their trading partners'
situations. When making foreign investment, investors should consider governance
environments carefully to choose their investment mode and protect their investment.
The implication is that countries with low levels of international trade that are trying to
promote trade must not only evaluate their trade policies, but also evaluate their
governance environment. Similarly, countries with low levels of foreign investment must
evaluate their governance environment. A policy can be changed relatively quickly, but it
will take much longer to change the governance environment, especially its cultural
components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and the multinational
companies must realize and be prepared to deal with.
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Chapter 3: Why Some Countries Trade More, Some Trade Less, Some Trade
Almost Nothing: The Effect of the Governance Environments on Trade Flows
3.1 Introduction
There are extensive studies about the importance of international trade in
economic development by both scholars and policy makers who have convincingly
shown that freer trade leads to higher welfare for a country. However, an unsolved yet
important issue ever lingering in this area is why some countries trade more than others
even after taking economic development and trade policy into consideration. Indeed this
question has motivated many scholars of trade to search for answers. Recently, Li and
Samsell (2009) used a relatively new framework of governance environment which
classifies countries into rule-based and relation-based environment to examine its effect
on trade flows and found that rule-based countries have larger trade flows than relationbased countries.
While Li and Samsell (2009) made a contribution in bringing the governance
environment into the model predicting trade flows, a major drawback of their governance
framework is that it is limited to two types of countries in the world: rule-based and
relation-based. As Li (2009) later acknowledges, the two categories are far from
exhaustive to cover all the countries in the world. Countries that have strong public
ordering (i.e. rule-based) usually are the ones with mature market systems and advanced
democracy, such as the United States and Western European countries. Countries that
lack public ordering and yet have extensive informal (privately ordered) social networks
(relation-based) include many Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, and Indonesia.
Left unexamined in the Li-Samsell framework is many countries that have neither public
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ordering nor extensive informal social networks. For instance, according to Li's (2009)
new classification, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia are neither highly rule-based nor
relation-based. Many of the least developed countries, such as some of the low-income
African countries, may also belong to this "neither" category. As a matter of fact, this
group includes the largest number of countries, but gets relatively little attention from
both policy makers and academic scholars. More importantly, these countries can benefit
significantly from increased trade, as shown in the following statistics.
If we group trade volume according to the more updated governance classification
by Li (2009) (namely, rule-based, relation-based, and neither-based), we can clearly see
that some significant differences exist among the three types of countries (see Table 3).
The most striking fact is that the average trade volume per capita of neither-based
countries is the lowest, and the gap between them and their rule-based and relation-based
counterparts is substantial. Rule-based countries trade three and 10 times more than
relation-based and neither-based countries, respectively.
[Please insert Table 3 about here]
Why do the neither-based countries trade so little? Is it because of their low
economic development level, their geography, and culture, as the previous literature
suggests, or does the governance environment play a role? If the governance environment
plays a role, why is it so?
To attempt to fill these gaps in the literature, we adopt the new classification of
governance environments developed by Li (2009) to explain why some countries trade
more, some trade less, and some other countries trade almost nothing with other countries.
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3.2 Theory Development and Hypotheses
3.2.1 The literature on trade flow
Scholars and policy makers have long recognized the importance of international
trade. Smith's (1776) absolute advantage theory, Ricardo's (1817) comparative
advantage theory - later refined by Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) - establish the
theoretical foundation for productivity and prosperity increases resulting from
specialization and free trade. In the 1980s, these free trade theories were challenged by
the so-called new trade theorists, who argued that in highly concentrated industries where
increasing returns to scale exist at a global level, the benefit of government intervention
may outweigh the cost for a country. However, even the new trade theorists recognized
the difficulty of applying such a theory and concluded that free trade still seems to be the
best policy choice (e.g. Krugman, 1987).

Empirically, numerous studies have provided evidence to support various trade
theories. The explanatory factors from these studies are summarized in Markusen, Melvin,
Kaempfer and Maskus (1995) and include differences in production functions,
differences in factor endowments, returns to scale, differences in consumer tastes and
preferences, and market distortions. Studies somewhat related to the governance
environment effect on trade tend to examine the distortive effects of taxes, quotas, and
subsidies. Examples of these studies include Melvin (1970, 1979, 1982), Magee (1971),
and Parry (2001).
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What is conspicuously missing from the earlier empirical study on the trade flows
is how the institutional environment of a country affects the trade flows to and from the
country.
More recently, as the use of the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to examine
social, economic, and business behavior increases and offers insights in studies of
international business behavior and outcome, trade scholars begin to examine how
institutional quality affects trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have been among the
main contributors to extend governance environment to international trade. They examine
how enforcement of the legal system affects import demands. They present evidence that
corruption and poor contract enforcement in a country increases the insecurity of selling
to that country, thereby reducing international trade. Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003)
introduce variables reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of potential trade
effects for Central and Eastern European countries. De Groot, Linders, Rietveld and
Subramanian (2004) adopt a comprehensive dataset developed by Kaufman, Kraay and
Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which includes the data sources used by Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) and Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003). De Groot et al. (2004)
capture the country-specific effect of governance on trade and also examine the bilateral
influence of governance similarity on patterns of trade.

Li and Samsell (2009) acknowledge that these studies provide valuable insights
into the powerful influence of the quality of a country's institutions on trade. But they
also argue that these studies focus on formal institutions and ignore the influence of
"informal rules". Furthermore, these studies do not distinguish between institutional
environments that promote trade and those that do not. Based on these arguments, Li and
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Samsell (2009) adopt a framework of governance environment and characterize these
environments (institutional matrixes) into rule-based and relation-based. They examine
the effect of rule-based and relation-based governance environments on international
trade flows.
This paper builds on Li and Samsell's (2009) study and uses a more recently
developed framework of governance environment, distinguishing not only rule-based and
relation-based environments, but also characterizing those environments that are neither
rule-based nor relation-based. We use this new framework to examine the effect of these
newly characterized environments on international trade flows.
3.2.2 Governance environments
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it
becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of
settling disputes. It becomes more likely they will look for a private way to solve
exchange disputes. This institutional environment is referred to as governance
environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social institutions that facilitate or
constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in a society (Li and Filer, 2007).
Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or norms. The institutional or
governance environment includes institutions, organizations, and the resulting

enforcement characteristics. Scholars have begun to pay attention to how institutional
environments affect economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997).
Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a framework that classifies the governance
environment across countries into two categories—rule-based and relation-based—in
terms of how people protect their property rights and contracts.
Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies,
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and ruleenforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the
legal infrastructures, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and
powerful enforcement branch, which is costly and takes a long time to build. This
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North
1990, 2005).

Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society
has the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and
government regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the
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legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are
controlled by the ruler(s); and public information is controlled by the state and is
untrustworthy. Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that there exist
closely knit informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections to protect
themselves and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and governed by
well-functioning social networks maintained by private players, the relation-based
governance system incurs few fixed costs compared to the cost structure of the rule-based
system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to lessen potential
prosperity by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange, and to restrict
impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005).

Neither-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the traditional
framework by introducing a third category of governance environment—neither-based,
also called family-based (in this study, we use them interchangeably). He argued that a
country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there are
some countries that have neither strong public rules, nor extensive informal social
networks to conduct and protect business. Li (2009) identifies an important factor that
distinguishes relation-based with neither-based societies—which is the dominant type of
particularized trust.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of trust in terms of who people trust:
generalized trust and particularized trust. People who hold generalized trust believe that
most people, including strangers, can be trusted. When people have very little confidence
or faith in strangers, they rely on people whom they know well, such as family members
or close friends. Such a trust is called particularized trust. The level of particularized
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trust people place on different relationships varies. The closest is among the direct
members of the family—spouse, parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins,
and other close kinship may be the next circle. The third circle usually includes friends,
neighbors and co-workers.
Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors,
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. Countries having a
relatively high level of extended particularized trust are relation-based. In contrast,
societies with extremely low levels of trust, where people predominantly rely on family
members to conduct business and to protect property rights, are referred to as neitherbased (family-based) societies. This environment is expected to lessen potential
prosperity the most by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange and to be the
most restrictive for impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005), and thus to be the most
restrictive for trade.
3.2.3 Trade flow and governance environment
Firms selling goods to a foreign country face many barriers, including tariffs,
quotas, restrictive laws and regulations, and other informal constraints (Hill, 2005). In
rule-based societies, the trade laws and regulations are relatively clear, effective, and
universally applied. Different from relation-based environments, both outsiders and
insiders are subject to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or
permits. Besides, the cost structure of rule-based societies—high fixed costs and low
marginal costs—encourages more participants in trade. Dixit (2003) shows that private
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enforcement (relation-based) "prevails only in a sufficiently small world". External
enforcement (rule-based) "is useful only if the world is sufficiently large".
By comparison, laws and regulations regarding trade in relation-based societies are
opaque and applied differently depending on the relationship of the prospective trader
within the authorities. According to Li et al. (2004), relation-based economies are
characterized by closed market sectors dominated by insiders, and outsiders find it is
difficult to break in because developing relationships are costly.
Similarly, in neither-based countries, people do not have too much confidence or
faith in anyone. But in order to conduct business, they have to rely on someone, usually
family members. Thus, neither-based governance is more restrictive than relation-based
because the economic cooperation is limited to family members only (tending to limit
trade to personal trade), which is not usually the most efficient choice (Li, 2009).
Comparing the three types of governance environment and their effects on trade flows,
we hypothesize as follows:
HI: Rule-based countries have more international trade than relation-based and familybased countries.
The above differences between rule-based and relation-based countries lead to
different levels of difficulty (marginal cost) in trade. The opaque laws and regulations
that favor insiders in relation-based society make relation-based markets difficult for
outsiders to enter, whereas the transparency and universal application of laws and
regulations in rule-based markets ensure a more level playing field for both inside and
outside traders. Li and Samsell (2009) find that it is less costly for a trader from a
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relation-based country to enter a rule-based market than vice versa. In this study, we will
retest this argument.
H2: It is easier (less costly) for a relation-based country to export to a rule-based
country than vice versa, so relation-based countries export more to rule-based countries
than to other relation-based countries.
De Groot et al. (2004) argue that countries tend to trade with countries with similar
institutional framework, because the time and costs of learning new rules and regulations
(marginal costs) are minimal for those partner countries that have similar institutions. Li
and Samsell (2009) find empirical evidence that countries with a larger gap in the scores
of governance environment index (GEI, see the detailed explanation in the method
section) or that have less similar governance environments tend to trade less. But they
argue that it does not mean that countries with more similar institutions trade more. To
resolve this issue, we retest this argument in this study.
H3: Countries with more similar governance environments trade more with one another
than countries with more dissimilar governance environments, ceteris paribus.
As Li and Samsell (2009) point out, De Groot et al.'s (2004) findings are only
partially true. The marginal transaction costs (learning, information, enforcement)
between rule-based countries tend to be low, but not between relation-based, or neitherbased trading partners. Once again, trading laws and regulations in rule-based societies
are clear, effective, and universally applied. While the forms of checks and balance may
vary, they all share some key commonalities, which help to reduce marginal transaction
costs between their partners. However, different relation-based societies may resort to
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totally different types of relation-based governance mechanisms. It is difficult for
outsiders to break in. Thus, even though two countries both have relation-based
environments, the marginal transaction cost may be still high. It takes a long time and
great effort to build relationships. Meanwhile, a trader's good relationship with some
powerful players in one country can not be transferred to another relation-based country,
although a trader's experience in cultivating private relationships with powerful players
in a relation-based country may help him or her to do the same in new relation-based
economies. Similarly, people in neither-based societies resort to family members in order
to protect their interest or to conduct business. This governance mechanism is even more
difficult for outsiders to enter than the relation-based governance mechanism. Therefore,
we argue that:

H4: Trade flows between two highly rule-based countries are greater than trade flows
between two highly relation-based countries (as well as between two highly neitherbased countries), ceteris paribus.
H5: Trade flows between two highly relation-based countries are greater than trade
flows between highly neither-based countries, ceteris paribus.
Informal rules such as social norms are an important part of the institutional
environment of a society. Social norms promoting honesty and trust reduce transaction
costs and promote exchange (North 2005). Trust is an important determinant of
cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social
institutions. Trust is also particularly important for the performance of large organizations
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Lack of trust could bring some
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negative effects. From the perspective of political system, a higher level of generalized
trust means that people have confidence that others will abide the rule of law and
cooperate in maintaining it. This will make a pluralistic political system such as
democracy work more efficiently. However, the lack of generalized trust creates more
friction in the political and economic activities in a country, which, in turn, makes
economic activities less efficient (Li, 2009). Li and Wu (2010) found that high levels of
trust in a society could help to mitigate the negative effect of corruption on economic
development. In a society with a high trust level, corrupt officials feel comfortable to
accept bribes from almost everyone. If officials deliver goods to people with the highest
bribe, it is likely to be "efficiency improving" corruption, because this briber usually is
the most efficient one so that he/she can offer the highest bribe. When the society lacks
trust, corrupt officials limit bribery to their families and close friends, who usually are not
the most efficient economic players. Similarly, neither-based societies are characterized
by a lack of extended particularized trust. Because of the lack of trust, economic
cooperation is limited to a much smaller number of people (maybe family members only),
which usually are not the most efficient choices. Thus, we argue that

H6: All other things being equal, it is most difficult (most costly) to trade with a familybased country.
3.3 Methods
In this section, we will introduce how data is collected, how variables are measured,
and how data is analyzed.
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3.3.1 Measuring governance environment
The Governance Environment Index (GEI) developed by Li and Filer (2007)
consists of five indicators: political rights; rule of law; quality of accounting standards;
free flow of information; and public trust. Each of the five components of the GEI is
standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one by subtracting the
mean from the value and then dividing by the SD of the values. The standardized
components are then summed to calculate the GEI for each country. A high GEI indicates
a country is more rule-based, while a low GEI indicates a country is more relation-based.
Li and Filer calculated the GEI for 44 countries for which all the five indicators are
available.
Li (2009) updated Li and Filer's (2007) GEI index and further improved their
classification into three categories (rule-based, relation-based, and neither-based societies)
with the addition of particularized trust. Li used the same five indicators but with data for
2005 and 2006. Similar to Li and Filer (2007), he calculated the GEI for 45 countries for
which all of the five indicators are available (See Table 4). On Table 4 there are 22
countries which have positive GEI index scores and 23 countries which have negative
GEI index scores. Since the average GEI is 0, a positive GEI country can be roughly
thought as rule-based, and a negative GEI score means the country is less rule-based.
However, it does not mean that it must be relation-based (Li, 2009). Some countries may
be governed by extensive informal social networks. Some may have neither public rules,
nor extensive informal social networks. Li (2009) recognizes a key indicator that can
distinguish more-relation-based with non-relation-based countries—the trust level in a
country.
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By examining the dominant type of particularized trust, Li (2009) distinguishes
relation-based countries from non-relation-based countries. He performs a cluster
analysis of countries with negative GEI scores by using criteria including generalized
trust, indicators trust of family, friends, and people one meets for the first time. The result
of the cluster analysis is shown in Table 5.
[Please insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here]
On average, as compared to those in Cluster 2, Cluster 1 countries have (1) a
higher level of generalized trust; (2) a slightly lower level of trust on family, and (3) a
higher level of trust on neighborhood and people one meets for the first time. They fit
our description of a relation-based country. In comparison, Cluster 2 countries have
slightly higher trust on family and lower trust on other trust measures. These are
countries in which most people do not rely on public rules or extended private relations.
Li (2009) also confirmed this clustering pattern by simply ranking these countries
by one of the most discriminating trust questions from World Value Survey 2005,
Question V47, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got
a chance, or would they try to be fair?" Relation-based countries have a higher
percentage of respondents who believe that people try to be fair (see Table 6).
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
3.3.2 Data on Trade flows
Following Li and Samsell (2009), we include all the countries for which the GEI is
available in our empirical analysis (45 countries; see Table 2). As can be seen from Table
2, these countries represent a mix of countries with different development levels from all
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major continents without systematic biases toward countries of a certain development
level or geographic concentration. We collected the trade data from the United Nations
Comtrade Statistics Database (United Nations, 2009). Import is the total volume of
imports in US dollars to the importing country (I) from the exporting country (E).
Imports are averaged by country for only the available data for the years 2005, 2006,
2007, and 2008. The averaging is to minimize the effect of any reporting deficiencies and
fluctuations in the data. The UN Comtrade database does not include data for Taiwan,
leaving 44 countries. The bilateral trade flows among 44 countries would generate 1892
(44x43) possible trade relationships. There are seven cases of no trade relationships,
leaving 1885 observations of imports flows between two countries.

3.2.3 Estimation Model
Following Li and Samsell (2009), we use an OLS gravity model with commonly
used country-specific variables to estimate the country-specific GEI effect and the effect
of trading partners' GEIs. This method allows us to use the country-specific GEIs for
both the importing and exporting countries, which is the main interest of our study, while
controlling for the effects of the factors that were found to influence trade flows in the
literature. We use the gravity model from Rose, Lockwood and Quah (2000) specified
generally as follows:

WXS)
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where i and j denote the reporting and partner countries. The variables are defined as: Xy
is the bilateral trade between the reporting and partner countries, Y is real GDP, P is
population, Dy is the distance between the reporting and partner countries, Govn are
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governance environment measures, and Factorm are the other control variables listed in
the earlier section and more fully described in Table 7.
[Please insert Table 7 about here]
3.4 Findings
We first calculate simple statistics and run a correlation matrix (see Table 8) for all
independent variables in order to identify any high correlations that may cause
multicollinearity. The highest correlation is between GEI and the log of GDP per capita,
which is about .74. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated for each
independent variable to test for multicollinearity. All VIF values are well below the
cutoff of 10 which suggests possible harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003), and so
we rule out any multicollinearity concerns.
[Please insert Table 8 and 9 about here]
Table 9 summarizes our data analysis using six model specifications with
different GEI variables (Model 1 to Model 3d, which will be explained in more detail
below). The R-squared for these models ranges from 0.673 to 0.704, and the F-statistics
range from 182.7 to 268.3 and are statistically significant (p<.001), indicating that the
models fit the data quite well. To facilitate our discussion of the results, below we will
present our data analysis model by model.
Model 1 uses the importer's (receiver) GEI labeled RGEI and the exporter's
(partner) GEI labeled PGEI to estimate the OLS model. The coefficients for RGEI and
PGEI are both positive and highly significant (at the p<0.001 levels), strongly supporting
HI that rule-based countries trade more.
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Model 2 uses the absolute gap (ABSGAP) between the GEIs of the trading
countries' (the importer's and the exporter's). The coefficient estimate for ABSGAP is
positive but not significant. Thus H3 is not supported. This is an important finding
because it shows that the original classification of governance environment into two
dichotomous groups may not capture all the major effects of governance environment on
trade patterns. While GEI can distinguish countries with strong public ordering with high
GEI scores (i.e. rule-based) from the countries with absence of strong public rules (low
GEI scores), it cannot separate the countries with low GEI scores further into relationbased and neither-based countries, which may have different trade flow patterns. A new
dimension may be needed to distinguish the two so that we can examine how the
difference affects trade flows, which is the main purpose of our study, namely, to
overcome the drawback of previous studies that argued that countries with similar
institutional environments tend to trade more (De Groot et al., 2004), or countries with
different institutional environments tend to trade less (Li and Samsell, 2009). Our
findings show that their arguments are only partially true.

Model 3 uses nine combinations of GEI relationships between the three types of
trade partner countries. The first three letters denote the exporting country's type and the
later three letters designate the governance type of the importing country. Among them,
"Rul" means rule-based countries, "Rel" means relation-based countries, and "Fam"
means family-based countries. For example, "RulRel" means trade flows from rulebased countries to relation-based countries. "FamRul" indicates trade flows from familybased countries to rule-based countries. We use the unlabelled middle countries as the
default category.
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We further test the sensitivity of Model 3 using various GEI cutoff points defined
as the number of standard deviations (SD) (with one SD=3.40) centered on the mean
(which is -0.01). For example, Model 3 use 0.75 SD as the cutoff point (i.e., excluding
the middle segment between the 0.75 SD cutoff points and retaining the observations in
the two tails, with the top tail (0.375 SD above the mean) labeled as rule-based countries
and the bottom tail (0.375 SD below the mean) as relation-based). This yields 56 percent
of the observations in the middle with 44 percent of the observations in the two tails. As
can be seen from Table 7, the cutoffs include 0.50 (SD), 0.75 (SD), 1.00 (SD) and 1.50
(SD), showing in the Model 3a, Model 3, Model 3c and Model 3d. Model 3a has the
largest number of rule-based countries along with the largest number of relation-based
countries, and the fewest neither-based countries. Model 3d has the fewest number (but
the strongest) of rule-based countries along with the fewest number (but the strongest) of
relation-based countries, and the most neither-based countries.

Throughout the four models, the coefficient estimates for RulRul, RulRel, RelRul,
and RelRel are all positive and significant. The effects of other combinations of
governance types that involve a family-based (or neither-based) (i.e., whether importing
from family-based countries or exporting to family-based countries, including RulFam,
RelFam, FamRul, FamRel and FamRel) on trade flows are all negative and highly
significant. These results provide strong support for H6 that trade is difficult (more costly)
with family-based countries.

The coefficient estimates for RulRel and RelRul in all four models are positive
and significant, and there is no significant difference between the coefficient estimates
for RelRul and RulRel in Models 3a and 3, implying that that the governance-related
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marginal trading costs are similar for relation-based countries selling (exporting) to rulebased countries and the other way around. However there is a larger difference in
Models 3c and 3d which include the strongest rule-based countries and the strongest
relation-based countries. Therefore, H2 is only supported in Models 3b and 3c.
Interestingly, this finding is not consistent with Li and Samsell (2009). Li and Samsell
(2009) found that the governance-related costs are different between RulRel and RelRul;
the coefficient was positive for RulRel and negative for RelRul. But their finding was
based on a misclassified relation-based group for they inappropriately included neitherbased countries in the former. The difference they captured was actually caused by the
neither-based countries. Now once we distinguish these three groups, the cost difference
between rule-based to relation-based and relation-based to rule-based is only different for
the strongest rule-based countries versus the strongest relation-based countries.

H4 and H5 argue that trade flows between two highly rule-based countries will be
greater than trade flows between two relation-based countries or two neither-based
countries. Again, the coefficient estimate for RulRul is positive and highly significant
(pO.OOl). In all four models (Model 3a, 3, 3c and 3d), RelRel are positive and
significant. However, contrary to the findings by Li and Samsell (2009), there is no
substantial difference between the coefficient estimates of RulRul and RelRel in Models
3a and 3, but the difference is substantial in Models 3c and 3d. In other words, the effects
of the governance environment on trade flows are both positive and strong between two
rule-based countries or between two relation-based countries; but the effects are most
positive and significant for trade between the strongest rule-based countries. Thus H4 is
only supported in Models 3c and 3d which include only the strongest rule-based countries
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and the strongest relation-based countries. Once again, when we separate neither-based
countries from the relation-based group, the difference between rule-based and relationbased countries becomes trivial in Models 3a and 3. In all four models (Model 3a, 3, 3c
and 3d), FamFam are all negative and significant, lending strong support for H5.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Recently scholars have begun to use the characteristics of the institutional or
governance environment to examine trade flows. Li and Samsell (2009) bring a new
aspect of governance environment into the literature. They examine the effect of
institutional environment quality on trade patterns and explore the different influences of
rule-based and relation-based governance environments on trade. However, Li and
Samsell left out a large number of countries which have neither strong public ordering or
extended social networks. This group of countries is relatively poor but large in number.
Accelerating their economic development is not only in the best interest of these
countries, but also contributes positively to the world economic order and world peace.
Unfortunately, the reasons why they trade so little has received little attention from trade
scholars.
Our study fills this gap in the literature by paying special attention to this category
of countries. Drawing on Li's (2009) updated framework of governance environment, we
add neither-based governance environment to the analysis of trade flows across countries.
Combined with rule-based and relation-based governance environment, this paper
examines how the governance environment affects international trade flows among the
three types of countries.
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We find that that being classified as a neither-based country has a negative effect
on trade flows, which means that both import and export of neither-based countries tend
to be relatively low. The major reason for this pattern is the lack of trust in these societies,
which prevents the establishment of informal, relation-based social networks which may
function as an effective governance mechanism when formal public rules and
enforcement are lacking. An effective governance mechanism is necessaiy for conducting
trade and the governance vacuum in the neither-based countries makes trade difficult.
This important discovery helps explain the puzzle as to why some countries trade
almost nothing, which the previous literature has failed to explain even after taking into
account low GDP level and other barriers such as culture, geography, and legal systems.
We show that the institutional environment explains why there are still many countries
that trade little thereby limiting their productivity and prosperity even though it is widely
known that trade improves welfare.
Our findings imply that increasing the level of rule-based governance from
relation-based or neither-based in a country can increase trade flows. We also find that
countries with dissimilar governance environments do not necessarily trade less, which is
different from former studies (De Groot et al., 2004; Li and Samsell, 2009). We find that
countries with similar higher levels of rule-based governance environments (the RulRul
trade relations) tend to trade more with one another, and is the highest between the
strongest rule-based countries. Trade flows will also be high if it is between two relationbased countries (the RelRel trade relations), but trade between the strongest relationbased countries will not be as high as between the strongest rule-based countries. If the
trade is between two neither-based countries (the FamFam trade relations), the effect of
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governance environment on trade flows is the most negative. In other words, countries
with similar neither-based governance environments tend to trade the least with one
another.
In addition to the contributions to the literature, our study provides important
policy implications. Our findings suggest that in considering trade policies, governments
should pay close attention to the governance environments to evaluate their own and their
trading partners' trading situations. The finding that rule-based and relation-based
countries tend to trade more and neither-based countries tend to trade less is important for
policy makers. All countries, regardless of their governance environment, trade less with
neither-based countries. The implication is that countries with low levels of international
trade that are trying to promote trade must not only evaluate their trade policies, but also
evaluate their governance environment. A trade policy can be changed relatively quickly,
but it will take much longer to change the governance environment, especially its cultural
components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and the trading
companies must realize and be prepared to deal with.
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Chapter 4: Foreign Direct Investment vs. Foreign Portfolio Investment: the Effect
of the Governance Environment
4.1 Introduction
Foreign investment has been increasing rapidly in both volume and the number of
participating countries. It has been an engine of economic growth worldwide and thus has
been a major subject of research for scholars of international business.
However, there are some deficiencies in the literature. First, most studies of
foreign investment have been focused on foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas
foreign indirect investment, or foreign portfolio investment (FPI), has been largely
ignored (Li and Filer, 2007). This leads to the second gap in the literature. The
relationship between foreign direct investment and indirect investment has not been
sufficiently examined. When the proportion of FDI over total foreign investment into a
country and the level of rule of law of the receiving countries are plotted, it is clear that
countries with a low level of the rule of law have a higher proportion of FDI (Li and Filer,
2007). Third, the effect of governance environments that lack the rule of law has not been
sufficiently examined. Recently, Li and Filer (2007) used a relatively new framework of
governance environments which classified countries into rule-based and relation-based
environments to examine its effect on the proportion of FDI and found that rule-based
countries have a smaller FDI proportion than relation-based countries.

While Li and Filer (2007) made a contribution in bringing the governance
environments into the model to predict the relative size of FDI and FPI, a major
drawback of their governance framework is that it is limited to two types of countries:
rule-based and relation-based. As Li (2009) later acknowledged, the two categories are
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far from exhaustive. Countries that have a strong public ordering (i.e. rule-based) usually
are the ones with mature market systems and advanced democracy, such as the United
States and Western European countries. Countries that lack public ordering and yet have
extensive informal relation-based social networks include many Asian countries such as
China, Taiwan, and Indonesia. Left unexamined in the Li-Filer framework are the
countries that have neither public ordering nor extensive informal social networks. For
instance, according to Li's (2009) new classification, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia are
neither highly rule-based nor relation-based, which he terms "family-based" (we will
explain it in more detail later). Many of the least developed countries, such as some of
the low-income African countries, may also belong to this third category. In fact, this
group includes the largest number of countries, but receives relatively little attention from
both policy makers and scholars. More importantly, these countries are large in number
and can benefit significantly from increased foreign indirect investment, as we will show
later.
If we group foreign investment according to the more updated governance
classification by Li (2009) (namely, rule-based, relation-based, and family-based), we can
clearly see that some interesting differences exist among the three categories of countries
(see Table 10). There is almost no difference among these three types of countries in the
FDI volume they attract. However, when we compare the FDI as a proportion of total
foreign investment, the average FDI proportion of family-based countries is the highest,
and the FDI ratio of relation-based and family-based countries is almost twice of that in
rule-based countries.
[Please insert Table 10 about here]
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Why do the family-based countries attract so little indirect (portfolio) investment?
Is it because of their low economic development level, their geography, and culture, as
the previous literature suggests, or does the governance environment play a role? If the
governance environment plays a role, why is it so?
To attempt to fill these gaps in the literature, we adopt the new classification of
governance environments developed by Li (2009) to explain why some countries attract
more and some attract less FDI.
4.2 Theory Development and Hypotheses
4.2.1 Mode of investment: direct versus indirect
Foreign investments include two categories: direct investment and portfolio
investment. In portfolio investment, investors invest capital only for a return through
purchasing securities, such as stocks and bonds. By contrast, in direct investment,
investors invest capital into a firm for not only a return but also participation the
management of the firm. Thus, the major difference between direct and portfolio
investment is control (Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, and Minor, 2002, p. 69).
Generally, if an investor controls 10% or more shares of a firm, it is direct investment
(Bell et al., 2002, p.69; Hill, 2003, p.204). However, the line between direct and portfolio
investment is increasingly blurred. In literature, "portfolio investment" is used more
commonly. But in this paper, we may use "indirect investment" and "portfolio investment"
interchangeably to contrast the directness and indirectness of the two modes of
investments.
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In direct investment, the investor directly oversees his/her investment; he/she has
firsthand information on the operations and does not need to rely on financial reports
issued by someone else, such as an accounting firm or a board in which he/she has no
control or access. Thus in direct investment, the risk of being misinformed or being
expropriated by others is substantially reduced, even in a governance environment that
lacks fair and efficient public ordering (e.g., low quality public financial information and
weak financial regulation), an investor can still effectively protect his/her investment.
Furthermore, if one has a good relationship with the ruler(s), the protection can be
extremely effective and favorable.
On the contrary, for portfolio investments, such as buying stocks and bonds in the
secondary market, the investor has no direct control over his/her investment; nor does
he/she have firsthand information about the operation. The lack of a good public
governance environment is especially hazardous for such investment. First, in societies
lacking in public ordering, there tends to be a dearth of reliable public information and a
low level of general trust. Accounting and auditing standards are lower, the operations of
publicly listed companies are less transparent, and financial information is easily altered
by insiders. Second, due to the lack of checks and balances and the lack of freedom of the
press, the political system in a society lacking of public ordering tends to be dominated
by a powerful dictator (who tends to view the country as his private property [Olson,
1993]). The state policies under such a dictator tend to favor industry leaders and big
businesses that have strong relations with the dictator. This puts the minority
shareholders, such as the portfolio investors, in a disadvantageous position.
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4.2.2 The literature on foreign investment
Foreign direct investment has been extensively studied by international business
scholars. The early literature had provided a theoretical rationale for FDI mainly through
the industrial organization economics research stream, e.g., costs of doing business
abroad and internalization (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969), firm specific competitive
advantage (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1971), risk diversification (Rugman, 1979),
product-life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), and the eclective paradigm (Dunning, 1980).
The "Uppsala Model", which posited an incremental international process (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), and the liability of foreignness
that highlights the MNE subsidiary's disadvantages in the host country (Kostova and
Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer, 1995) supplemented those approaches. These theories suggest
various determinants of potential FDI patterns such as country-level determinants (e.g.,
economic and political stability, host government policies, market size, gross domestic
product, cultural distance, tax rates, wages, corruption, and production and transportation
costs [Hofstede, 1980; Nigh, 1985; Root and Ahmed, 1979]), industry-level determinants
(e.g., sales growth, asset intensity, growth in the number of firms [Luo, 2001]), and firmlevel determinants (e.g., knowledge protection, global integration, host country
experience [Luo, 2001]).

In this paper, we focus on the effect of socioeconomic and political factors on
patterns of FDI. In this research stream, some scholars draw on Dunning's eclectic theory
to identify policy and non-policy factors that affect the FDI location choice (e.g.,
Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova 1998; Loree and Guisinger, 1995); some study FDI
and trade patterns simultaneously by using the gravity model developed by international
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trade economists (e.g., Hejazi and Safarian, 2002); and another sub-stream focuses on
how political risks affect the FDI flow (e.g., Butler and Joaquin, 1998; Henisz, 2000).
In recent years, scholars have begun to pay increasing attention to the macro
environments in a society and to its effect on investments. One of the main foci is on how
different governance environments, such as the legal system, affect the willingness of
investors to invest and how investments are protected. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) found that countries with better legal systems tend to have a
small number of diversified investors. English and Moore (2002) found that when a firm
announced its investment in a country with ambiguous property rights, its stock value
actually was affected negatively. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found that governance
infrastructure—including the nature of the legal system—is an important determinant of
FDI. Specifically, countries with a more impartial and transparent legal system and better
protection of property rights tend to attract more FDI; countries lacking a good legal
system and less adequate protection of property rights attract less FDI.

Although these studies examined how different governance environments affect
the FDI patterns, they still did not directly address the relationship between direct and
indirect investment. Three studies provided some insight into these issues. Itay and Razin
(2005) found that there is a higher ratio of FDI to FPI in developing countries relative to
developed countries. They argue that the hands-on nature of FDI investors enables them
to obtain special information about the operations of the firm. However, the cost of this
superior information possessed only by FDI investors is that FDI assets have a lower
resale price. They use this argument to explain the variation of FDI and FPI in developed
and developing countries. Albuquerque (2003) found that FDI is less volatile than other
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financial flows such as FPL He explained that is because FDI is harder to expropriate
under financing constraints. Li and Filer (2007) are among the first to examine the effect
of governance environments on the variation of FDI and FPL They used a relatively new
framework of governance environments, rule-based and relation-based and found that in
countries with a weak rule-based governance environment, investors prefer direct to
indirect investment, because the former can be better protected by private means.
This study builds on Li and Filer's (2007) study and uses the latest framework of
governance environments developed by Li (2009), distinguishing not only rule-based and
relation-based environments, but also characterizing those environments that are neither
rule-based nor relation-based. We use this new framework to examine the effect of these
newly characterized environments on variation of foreign investment flows.
4.2.3 Governance environments
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it
becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of
settling disputes, but will look for a private method. This institutional environment is
referred to as governance environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social
institutions that facilitate or constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in a society
(Li and Filer, 2007). Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or norms.
The institutional or governance environment includes institutions, organizations, and the
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resulting enforcement characteristics. Scholars have begun to pay attention to how
institutional environments affect economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997).
Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a framework that classifies the governance
environment across countries into two categories—rule-based and relation-based—in
terms of how people protect their property rights and contracts.
Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies,
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and ruleenforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the
legal infrastructure, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and
powerful enforcement branch, all of which are costly and take a long time to build. This
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North
1990,2005).

Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society
has the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and
government regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the
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legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are
controlled by the ruler(s); and public information is controlled or manipulated by the state
and thus is untrustworthy. Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that
there exist closely knit informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections
to protect themselves and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and
governed by well-functioning social networks maintained by private players, the relationbased governance system incurs few fixed costs compared to the high fixed-cost structure
of the rule-based system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to
lessen potential prosperity by increasing the marginal transactions costs per exchange and
to restrict impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005).

Family-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the Li-Filer
framework (2007) by introducing a third category of governance environment. He argued
that a country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there
are some countries that have neither strong public rules nor extensive informal social
networks to conduct and protect business. In such societies, people have little trust in
others and rely primarily on their immediate family members for protection in business.
Li (2009) called this type of governance environment family-based and identified an
important factor that distinguishes the relation-based societies from the family-based
societies—the dominant type of particularized trust.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of trust: generalized trust and particularized
trust. People who hold generalized trust believe that most people, including strangers, can
be trusted. When people have very little confidence or faith in strangers, they rely on
people whom they know well, such as family members or close friends. Such a trust is
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called particularized trust. The level of particularized trust people place on different
relationships varies. The closest is among the direct members of the family—spouse,
parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins, and other close kin may be the
next circle. The third circle usually includes friends, neighbors, classmates, and coworkers.
Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors,
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. In our framework, we
use the term "relation-based" to describe countries with a relatively high level of
extended particularized trust. In contrast to these countries, there are societies with
extremely low levels of trust (including particularized trust), where people predominantly
rely on family members to conduct business and to protect property rights. Behind their
immediate family members, they essentially trust no one, and thus the term "family-based"
is coined. This type of governance environment is viewed as having the biggest hurdle in
achieving prosperity due to the even higher marginal transactions costs and being the
most restrictive for impersonal (rule-based) exchange, such as investment that relies on
public ordering (North 1990, 2005).

4.2.4 Foreign investment and governance environments
As stated above, direct investment allows an investor to govern his/her assets, and
thus direct investment is easier to protect than indirect investment. As a result, when
investing in an economy that is non-rule-based, people tend to choose more direct
investment as opposed to portfolio investment for better protection of their investment
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through private means. In contrast, rule-based societies, which have a well-developed
public information infrastructure, a high level of public trust, and fair and efficient public
protection, offer better protection for indirect (portfolio) investments than do non-rulebased societies. As a result, rule-based societies tend to have a large portfolio investment
market (such as publicly traded stock markets and bond markets). Thus, we hypothesize
as follows:
HI: Foreign investors are less likely to choose direct investment when they invest in
rule-based societies and more likely to choose direct investment when they invest in
relation-based in relation-based societies and family-based societies, ceteris paribus.
H2: The size of the stock market relative to the size of the economy tends to be
larger in rule-based societies than in relation-based societies and family-based

societies,

ceteris paribus.
In relation-based societies, public rules are less fair because it is usually biased in
favor of certain privileged groups; government operations are secretive; and public
information and the media tend to be controlled and manipulated by the government.
However, there is usually a thick and strong relational network. Neighbors, friends, and
friends' friends are closely knit by extended particularized trust. If the investors have
connections with the insiders (such as powerful politicians in the country), they can have
access to insider information and enjoy informal and effective protection for their
investment.

Similar to relation-based societies, family-based countries lack trustworthy public
information and effective public ordering. The legal system is not transparent or fair, and

54
the state is unable to enforce laws impartially. Different from relation-based countries,
however, in family-based societies people do not have much confidence or faith in
anyone. But in order to conduct business, they have to rely on some people, who are
usually their family members. For example, in Russia, "The system is not based on law, it
is based on personal connections, likes and dislikes, in many cases, on marriages" (BBC
World Service Podcast, 2009). Obviously, it is virtually impossible or at least very
difficult for outsiders to enter into a nuclear family circle. Logically, it is very difficult
for investors to protect their investments, especially portfolio investment which relies
primarily on public information (company financial report and public auditing) and the
enforcement of the public rules for protection. Again, direct investment is less risky
since the investor is also the manager who oversees his/her own assets. Thus the favored
mode of investment in family-based societies tends to be the direct investment, and the
portfolio investment market tends to be small relative to that in the rule-based and
relation-based societies. Thus, we argue that:

H3: Foreign investors are more likely to choose direct investment when they invest
in family-based societies than in relation-based societies, ceteris paribus.
H4: The size of the stock market relative to the size of the economy will be larger in
relation-based societies than in family-based societies, ceteris paribus.
4.3 Methods
In this section, we will introduce how data is collected, how variables are measured,
and how data is analyzed.
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4.3.1 Measuring governance environments
We have mentioned how to measure governance environments in Section 3.3.1
and the results and process are shown in Table 4, 5 and 6.
4.3.2 Dependent variables
We use various dependent variables in our models to test above hypotheses. To test
the foreign investment hypotheses (HI and H3), we specify the dependent variable as the
share of foreign direct investment in relation to the economy's total foreign investment
position (FDIFI). Since we have constructed the total foreign investment measure as the
sum of foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment, a smaller measure of
FDI_FI suggests that foreign investment focuses on portfolio investment.
To test the stock market hypotheses (H2 and H4), we specify a measure of market
depth and size by using market capitalization. The first specification uses this
capitalization measure relative to the economy's GDP (CAP_GDP). In an alternative
specification, we also consider the market capitalization measure alone and we control
for the size of the economy on the right-hand side. The full description of these variables
and their sources are listed in Table 11.

4.3.3 Control variables
Our choices of control variables are based on previous studies. There is a rich
literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. Globerman and Shapiro (2003)
found that the foreign exchange rate affects direct investment flows and they also found
that the existence of English common law in a country exerts a positive effect on
attracting direct investment from the United States. La Porta et al. (1998) found that the
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different legal traditions (English common law and different families of Continental law)
have different effects on investor protection. Based on these two studies, which are most
relevant to our studies, we include foreign exchange rate (FXRATE) and legal tradition
index in our models. Following La Porta et al. (1998), we specify four legal traditions: (1)
English common law tradition, (2) French civil law tradition, (3) German civil law
tradition, and (4) Scandinavian civil law tradition. We use dummy variables to present
the four legal families: E N G L A W , FREJLAW, G E R L A W , and SCAJLAW (the
default, or the omitted category is other countries with an unspecified legal tradition). To
test the stock market hypotheses, we include GDP and the age of the stock market (AGE)
as additional controls.
Another control variable based on the previous literature is the openness variable in
examining FDI hypotheses. In certain countries the investors may have no access to
portfolio markets and thus any investment they make must be in the form of direct
investment (Li and Filer, 2007). We add a dummy variable OPEN. OPEN is equal to 0 if
any of the following controls on foreign investment exists: (1) ceiling on the percentage
of foreign ownership in a particular stock, (2) restrictions on the repatriation of income
and earned interest, or (3) direct control preventing entry of foreign investors into the
market. OPEN equal to 1 if the market is accessible to foreign investors.
When we test the stock market hypotheses (H2 and H4), we also create a dummy
variable for Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a special case because it is strongly based on the
English tradition with mature public rules and at the same time is heavily influenced by
the Chinese relation-based culture. Furthermore, Hong Kong is a city-state whose
economy highly dependent on international trade and finance. During the past decade, as
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Hong Kong's manufacturing industry moved to the mainland, its service industry—
mainly finance and trade—has grown rapidly and accounted for about 90% of the
territory's GDP. Based on these reasons, we create a dummy variable for Hong Kong
only.4 Detailed descriptions of all variables and their sources are shown in Table 11.
[Please insert Table 11 about here]
4.4 Findings
We first calculate descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix (see Table 12) for
all independent variables in order to identify any high correlations that may cause
multicollinearity problem. The highest correlations in absolute value are between Rul and
FDI_FI and between Rul and GEI, which are -0.86 and 0.86, respectively. But neither of
these combinations is used in the same regression. The second highest correlation is 0.76
between GEI and FDI_FI. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated for each
independent variable. All VIF values are well below the cutoff of 10 which rules out any
multicollinearity concerns.
[Please insert Table 12 about here]
Tables 13 and 14 summarize our data analysis. Table 13 gives the data analysis
results of the FDI hypotheses (HI and H3). Four specifications are used to examine these
hypotheses and illustrate the robustness of the results. Model 1 examines the Li-Filer
model (2007) of the influence of GEI, legal structure, exchange rate changes, the log of
GDP and the openness of the financial market to possible portfolio flows on the log of

4

We run the models with and without the Hong Kong dummy variable. There are no significant differences
between the two specifications in terms of the overall results of the models and the estimates of the
variables of interests.
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foreign direct investment (FDI). In Model 2, we use the same control variables as above
and replace the influence of GEI with two dummy variables, Rel and Fam. Model 3 and
Model 4 regress the dependent variable, the FDI to total foreign investment ratio, on the
same set of independent variables used in Models 1 and 2.
[Please insert Table 13 about here]
The results for Model 1 and 2 illustrate the incomplete picture based on models
with only FDI in absolute value as the dependent variable. The estimates of all
governance environments measures, GEI, Rel and Fam, are insignificant. The governance
environment cannot explain the flows of the total value of FDI. When the dependent
variable is changed to relative size of FDI over total foreign investments (Models 3 and
4), the two governance variables become highly significant and the adjusted R-squares
increase dramatically (from around 0.2 in Model 1 and 2 to 0.7 in Model 3 and 0.8 in
Model 4). In Model 3, the coefficient estimate of GEI, which is negative and highly
statistically significant, shows that the more rule-based a country, the smaller FDI
investment will be as a share of the total foreign investment. When GEI is replaced with
two dummies (Rel and Fam) in Model 4, the coefficient estimates of both dummies are
positive and highly statistically significant. In this model, the default is rule-based
governance. It seems that in rule-based countries the FDI-total foreign investment ratio
will be the smallest, compared to relation-based and family-based countries. So HI is
strongly supported.

Since both the estimates of the relation-based dummy and the family-based dummy
are positive and significant and the estimate of the family-based is larger than that of the
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relation-based, it is apparent that the family-based countries attract more FDI relative to
total foreign investment than do relation-based countries, exactly as hypothesized in H3.
To further compare the estimates of relation-based dummy and family-based dummy
statistically, we rerun Model 4 and use the relation-based category as the default (shown
in Model 4a). Compared with relation-based countries, rule-based countries attract
significantly less FDI (relative to total foreign investment), which is consistent with HI.
However, the estimate of family-based countries is positive but insignificant. This means
that there is no significant difference between estimate of family-based and relationbased countries. Thus, we cannot conclude that family-based countries attract more FDI
(relative to total foreign investment) than do relation-based countries. Thus we cannot
conclude that H3 is supported.
Table 14 is the data analysis results of the stock market size hypotheses H2 and H4.
To test these hypotheses, we use two alternative specifications of the size of the stock
market: market capitalization of listed companies in U.S. dollars (CAP) and market
capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP (CAPGDP). In the models
that use CAP (Model 5 and 6), we also control for the effect of GDP, since the
capitalization of the market is likely to depend on the size of the economy. In all these
models, we control for the length of time the market has existed as of 2006 (AGE).
[Please insert Table 14 about here]
Models 5 and 6 use absolute market capitalization as the dependent variable.
Estimates of all governance environments measures, GEI, Rel and Fam, are insignificant
once again, showing that governance environments cannot explain the absolute value of
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market capitalization. However, when the dependent variable is changed to market
capitalization as percentage of GDP (as in Model 7 and 8), the regressions are more
significant and the adjusted R-squares increase markedly (from around 0.17 to around
0.82). In Model 7, the estimate of GEI is positive and statistically significant, showing
that the more a country relies on public ordering (more rule-based), market capitalization
will constitute a larger share of its economy size.
When GEI is replaced with two dummies (Rel and Fam) to measure governance
environments in Model 8, estimates of both these two dummies are negative and
statistically significant. In these regressions, the default effect is that of rule-based
governance. It means that in rule-based countries, the relative market capitalization will
be the highest, compared to relation-based and family-based countries. Consequently H2
is supported. Estimates of the both dummies (Rel and Fam) are positive and significant,
but the estimate of the relation-based dummy is relatively smaller than that of the familybased dummy, implying that the market capitalization is greater in the family-based
economy than it is in the relation-based economy. This is opposite to the direction we
proposed in H4. Thus H4 is not supported.
[Please insert Table 15 about here]
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Foreign investment has been extensively studied in the literature. However, most
studies focus on foreign direct investment. Foreign portfolio investment has largely been
ignored and the relationship between direct and portfolio investment is unexamined. In
addition, the effect of governance environment, especially a governance environment that
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lacks the rule of law, has not been sufficiently examined. Recently, Li and Filer (2007)
bring a new aspect of governance environment into the literature. They examined the
effects of institutional environment quality on foreign investment and explored the
different influence of rule-based and relation-based governance environment on foreign
investment. Li and Filer left out countries which have neither strong public ordering nor
extended informal social networks. This non-rule-based and non-relation-based group of
countries is relatively poor but large in number. Identifying factors that may hinder
investment flows and effectively dealing with these factors is not only an academic
exercise, but beneficial to the economic development in these countries and to foreign
investors who are investing or plan to invest in these countries. Our study sheds light on
this issue which has been largely unexamined by scholars.
Our study fills this gap in the literature by focusing on this third group of countries.
Drawing on Li's (2009) updated framework of governance environment, we add familybased governance environment, along with rule-based and relation-based governance
environment, to the analysis of the patterns of foreign investment across countries.
We find that family-based countries tend to have a lower portfolio to total foreign
investment ratio, much like relation-based countries. Our explanation for this pattern is
that due to the lack of effective rule of laws, foreign investors prefer to participate in the
management of their investment to reduce information noise and expropriation risks
faced by portfolio investments. We also find that rule-based countries have the largest
stock markets relative to their economies because of their better public ordering, the flip
side of the very same reason that makes investors to choose direct investment in non-rulebased countries.
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Our rinding helps explain the puzzle why some countries attract relatively more
FDI and others attract relatively more portfolio investment, a puzzle which the previous
literature has failed to explain even after taking into account low GDP level and other
barriers such as culture, geography, and legal systems. We show that the governance
environment explains why there are still many countries that attract little foreign
investment thereby limiting their productivity and prosperity even though it is widely
known that foreign investment is the engine of economic growth worldwide.
In addition to the contributions to the literature, our study provides useful policy
implications. Our findings suggest that in formulating foreign investment policies,
governments and investors should pay close attention to the governance environment.
The finding that rule-based countries tend to have smaller FDI to total foreign investment
ratios than that of family-based and relation-based countries is important for policy
makers. The implication is that countries with low levels of foreign investment trying to
attract investment should not only evaluate their investment policies, but also evaluate
their governance environment. Foreign investment policies can be changed relatively
quickly, but it will take much longer to improve the governance environment, especially
its cultural components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and
multinational corporations must realize and be prepared to deal with.
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Table 1. Governance Environment Index (GEI) and Governance Environment Type
Country
Finland
Sweden
Netherlands
Germany
United Kingdom
Switzerland
New Zealand
Hong Kong
Australia
South Africa
United States
Cyprus
Slovenia
France
Japan
Poland
Spain
Ghana
Italy
South Korea
Trinidad & Tobago
Chile

GEI
6.41
6.18
5.7
4.53
4.35
4.34
4.04
4.02
3.73
3.11
2.3
2.28
2.23
1.97
1.79
1.32
1.18
0.95
0.94
0.24
0.12
0.12

Type

I

1
]

Country
Vietnam
China
Indonesia
Taiwan
Thailand
Mexico
Mali
Malaysia
Zambia
Moldova
Russia
Peru
Ukraine
Egypt
Colombia
Argentina
Brazil
Romania
Bulgaria
Iran
Turkey
India
Morocco

GEI
-5.19
-5.92
-1.1
-0.13
-0.84
-3.71
-1.81
-2.91
-2.64
-3.43
-4.34
-1.92
-0.86
-3.04
-3.69
-2.75
-2.06
-0.63
-1.75
-8.13
-2.75
-0.85
-3.7

Trust5
6.16
5.92
5.09
5.08
4.53
4.46
4.33
4.12
4.01
3.88
3.65
3.63
3.6
3.36
3.26
3.12
3.1
3.07
2.82
2.8
2.75
2.35
2.02

T

(Source: Li, 2009)
Type: 1—rule-based, 2—relation-based, 3—neither-based.

5

This score is from one of the most discriminating trust questions in the 2005 World Value Survey,
Question V47, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or
would they try to be fair?" l="try to take advantage of you", 2.. .6, 7="try to be fair."

yp
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Propositions

Partner
Trade
FDI

Summary of theoretical propositions
Rule-based
Relation-based
Easiest
Moderate
Least
Moderate

Neither-based
Most Difficult
Largest
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Table 3. Classification and Comparison of Trade Volume of Different Countries
Trade volume ($billions)

Trade volume per capita

Category

N

Mean

S.D.

F-value

Mean

S.D.

F-value

Rule-based

946

4.79

13.70

1.73

202.6

1,356.6

4.18

Relation-based

338

5.16

23.90

76.4

586.2

Neither-based

601

1.32

3.51

19.0

41.8

Total

1,885

14.20

121.4

996.0

f

3.75

P<0.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1

40.36 f

**

18.18 f
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Table 4. Governance Environment Index (GEI) by Country
Country
Finland
Sweden
Netherlands
Germany
United Kingdom
Switzerland
New Zealand
Hong Kong
Australia
South Africa
United States
Cyprus
Slovenia
France
Japan
Poland
Spain
Ghana
Italy
South Korea
Trinidad & Tobago
Chile

(Source: Li, 2009)

GEI
6.41
6.18
5.70
4.53
4.35
4.34
4.04
4.02
3.73
3.11
2.30
2.28
2.23
1.97
1.79
1.32
1.18
0.95
0.94
0.24
0.12
0.12

Country
Taiwan
Romania
Thailand
India
Ukraine
Indonesia
Bulgaria
Mali
Peru
Brazil
Zambia
Turkey
Argentina
Malaysia
Egypt
Moldova
Colombia
Morocco
Mexico
Russia
Vietnam
China
Iran

GEI
-0.13
-0.63
-0.84
-0.85
-0.86
-1.10
-1.75
-1.81
-1.92
-2.06
-2.64
-2.75
-2.75
-2.91
-3.04
-3.43
-3.69
-3.70
-3.71
-4.34
-5.19
-5.92
-8.13
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Table 5. Clustering of More Relation-Based Versus More Family-Based Countries on
Trust
Country
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Zambia

Country
Cluster
Argentina
2
Brazil
2
Bulgaria
2
Colombia
2
i
Egypt
2
India
2
Iran
2
Moldova
2
Morocco
2
2
Peru
Romania
2
Russia
2
Turkey
2
Ukraine
2
(1 = more relation-based; 2 = more family-based)

(Source: Li, 2009)

Cluster
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Table 6. Ranking of Relation-based Countries
Country
Vietnam
China
Indonesia
Taiwan
Thailand
Mexico
Mali
Malaysia
Zambia
Moldova
Russia
Peru
Ukraine
Egypt
Colombia
Argentina
Brazil
Romania
Bulgaria
Iran
Turkey
India
Morocco

Trust Score
6.16
5.92
5.09
5.08
4.53
4.46
4.33
4.12
4.01
3.88
3.65
3.63
3.60
3.36
3.26
3.12
3.10
3.07
2.82
2.80
2.75
2.35
2.02

(Scores are average answer by each country. High score means people in a
country incline to agree that "people try to be fair", indicating the country is more
relation-based; low score means people in a country incline to agree that "people
try to take advantage of me," indicating it is less relation-based.)
(Source: Li, 2009)
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Table 7. Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Variable
Imports,
Exports

GDP,
Population

Data Source
United
Nations
Comtrade
Statistics
Database,
(United
Nations,
2009).
World
Development
Indicators
(WDI)
(World
Bank, 2008)

GEI

GEI scores
are from Li
(2009),
which
reflect the
governance
environment
around 2004
and 2005.

Distance,
Religion,
Language,
Borders,
Island,
Landlocked

2008 CIA
World Fact
Book
Web Site
(Central
Intelligence
Agency,
2008).

Variable Description
Imports. Import is the total volume of imports in U.S.
dollars to the importing country (I) from the exporting
country (E). The trade data is from the United Nations
Comtrade Statistics Database (United Nations, 2009).
Imports are averaged by country for only the available data
for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The averaging is
to minimize the effect of any reporting deficiencies and
fluctuations in the data.
GDP, Population, and GDP per capita. GDP is the average
of the reported GDP in U.S. dollars for the three years
2004, 2005, and 2006. The GDP and population data come
from World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank,
2008) and is averaged for the same three years. Population
is the average of the reported population for the same three
years.
The GEI consists of five indicators: political rights; rule of
law; quality of accounting standards; free flow of
information; and public trust. Each of the five components
of the GEI is standardized to a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one by subtracting the mean from the value
and then dividing by the standard deviation of the values.
The standardized components are then summed to
calculate the GEI for each country. A high GEI indicates a
country is more rule-based while a low GEI indicates a
country is more relation-based.
Distance. Previous studies have used the gravity model to
capture the exponential effect of distance on the level of
trade between two countries and the effect of the other
independent variables. Deardorff (1995) examines the use
of the gravity model for trade flow estimations involving a
distance variable. We calculate distance using the "great
circle equation" and the mid-country coordinates obtained
from the CIA World Fact Book (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2008). The above studies consistently find
distance, as a proxy for transportation costs, to be
significantly inversely related to trade flows. Shared
Borders, Island, Landlocked. In addition to distance, other
geographical related variables have been used in past
studies to represent effects on trading costs. The data for
these variables come from the CIA World Fact Book
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). Countries sharing a
common border, counties that are islands, and countries
that are landlocked are represented with dummy variables.
Language and Religion. Past studies find culture, as
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Former
Colonial
Relationship

Grier (1999).

Trade
agreement
membership

EU27

6

represented by language and religion, to be significant in
explaining the overall level of bilateral trade flows.
Language and religion are dummy variables set to 1 if
countries match and zero if not. These variables, obtained
from the CIA World Fact Book (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2008).
Former Colonial Relationship. As in prior papers, we
control for possible trade effects between countries with a
former colonial relationship using dummy variables. The
designation of these relationships follows the listings in
Grier (1999).
Trade Agreements. Consistent with some of the earlier
studies, we include control variables for membership in the
agreements of EU 27 (the economic and political union of
27 European countries).6

We did not control some other trade agreements such as WTO, NAFTA and EFTA because either most of
our countries (only 1 or 2 left) belong to an agreement or only 1 or 2 countries belong to an agreement. In
fact, Li and Samsell (2009) included all of these agreements and found that the average is either close to 1
or close to 0. So we did not include these agreements.

Mean S.D
1
Import(log)
19.13 3.21
2
RGEI
-0.01 3.39
-0.02 3.40
3
PGEI
4
ABSGAP
3.98 2.82
5
RulRul
0.13 0.33
6
RulRel
0.05 0.22
7
RulFam
0.09 0.29
8
RelRul
0.05 0.22
0.02 0.12
9
RelRel
10
RelFam
0.03 0.18
11
FamRul
0.09 0.29
12
0.04 0.18
FamRel
13
FamFam
0.06 0.23
14
8.52 7.99
Distance(log)
15
GDP(log)
53.40 2.20
16 GDP capita (log) 18.72 1.41
17
Language
0.13 0.34
18
Religion
0.18 0.38
19
EU27
0.08 0.27
20
0.04 0.19
Border
21 R British Colony 0.20 0.40
22 R Spanish Colony 0.11 0.32
23 P British Colony
0.20 0.40
24 P Spanish Colony 0.11 0.32
25
Reporterlsland
0.16 0.37
26
Partnerlsland
0.16 0.37
27 ReporterLandlock 0.09 0.29
28 PartnerLandlock
0.09 0.28

1
1.00
0.15
0.18
0.06
0.22
0.00
0.00
-0.03
-0.05
-0.10
-0.02
-0.13
-0.09
-0.18
0.74
0.41
0.06
0.13
0.20
0.20
-0.04
-0.10
-0.06
-0.06
-0.03
-0.04
-0.22
-0.32

3
1.00
0.01
0.41
0.25
0.35
-0.25
-0.14
-0.20
-0.32
-0.19
-0.25
-0.05
-0.01
0.43
0.01
-0.04
0.24
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.10
-0.23
-0.01
0.27
0.01
-0.07

2
1.00
-0.03
0.01
0.41
-0.25
-0.32
0.25
-0.14
-0.18
0.35
-0.21
-0.25
-0.06
-0.01
0.43
0.05
0.01
0.24
-0.02
0.10
-0.25
0.00
0.01
0.28
-0.01
-0.04
0.01
1.00
-0.29
0.28
0.35
0.28
-0.09
-0.15
0.35
-0.15
-0.19
-0.05
0.09
0.12
-0.07
-0.11
-0.10
-0.09
-0.04
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
-0.03
-0.04
-0.02
-0.01

4

1.00
-0.09
-0.12
-0.09
-0.05
-0.07
-0.12
-0.07
-0.10
-0.05
0.08
0.48
0.03
0.00
0.30
0.04
0.04
-0.14
0.04
-0.14
0.16
0.16
-0.04
-0.03

5

1.00
-0.07
-0.05
-0.03
-0.04
-0.07
-0.04
-0.06
0.02
-0.05
-0.05
0.06
-0.06
-0.07
-0.02
0.07
0.04
0.03
-0.08
-0.10
0.10
0.20
-0.02

6

1.00
-0.07
-0.04
-0.06
-0.10
-0.06
-0.08
0.00
0.05
0.13
-0.08
-0.02
-0.04
-0.03
-0.09
0.16
0.03
-0.10
-0.14
0.12
-0.04
-0.03

7

1.00
-0.03
-0.04
-0.07
-0.04
-0.06
0.02
-0.04
-0.05
0.05
-0.03
-0.07
-0.02
0.03
-0.08
0.08
0.05
0.10
-0.10
-0.02
0.19

8

1.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.02
-0.03
0.04
-0.06
-0.21
0.03
-0.01
-0.04
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.02
-0.05
-0.05
0.10
0.10

9

10

1.00
-0.06
-0.04
-0.05
0.05
-0.04
-0.20
-0.05
0.03
-0.06
-0.02
-0.06
0.10
0.06
0.03
-0.08
-0.07
-0.06
0.13

Table 8. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Model Variables

1.00
-0.06
-0.08
-0.02
0.05
0.13
-0.07
0.00
-0.04
-0.04
0.04
-0.11
-0.09
0.16
0.13
-0.14
-0.03
0.00

11

1.00
-0.05
0.06
-0.05
-0.21
-0.01
0.02
-0.06
-0.02
0.06
0.03
-0.05
0.09
-0.08
-0.08
0.16
0.00

12

1.00
-0.02
0.02
-0.11
-0.01
0.05
-0.07
0.10
-0.08
0.12
-0.06
0.12
-0.11
-0.09
-0.03
-0.01

13
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Distance
LnYY
LnYPYP
Language
Religion
EU27
Border
R British Colony
R Spanish Colony
P British Colony
P Spanish Colony
Reporterlsland
Partnerlsland
ReporterLandlock
PartnerLandlock

14
1.00
0.02
-0.05
0.01
-0.09
-0.40
-0.26
0.15
0.23
0.15
0.24
0.15
0.15
-0.08
-0.08
1.00
0.38
-0.05
0.07
-0.01
0.09
-0.05
-0.02
-0.05
-0.02
-0.05
-0.06
-0.22
-0.19

15

1.00
-0.04
0.07
0.30
0.04
-0.10
-0.06
-0.10
-0.05
0.17
0.15
-0.15
-0.14

16

1.00
0.17
-0.09
0.13
0.22
0.07
0.14
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.01
-0.01

17

1.00
-0.01
0.17
0.00
0.15
-0.01
0.14
0.00
-0.04
-0.02
-0.01

18

1.00
0.11
-0.15
-0.11
-0.15
-0.11
0.00
-0.01
-0.09
-0.09

19

1.00
-0.06
0.02
-0.06
0.02
-0.08
-0.08
0.00
-0.01

20

1.00
-0.18
-0.02
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.04
0.00

21

1.00
0.00
-0.02
-0.16
0.00
-0.11
0.01

22

1.00
-0.18
0.00
0.09
-0.01
0.03

23

1.00
0.01
-0.16
0.00
-0.11

24

1.00
-0.02
-0.14
0.00

25

1.00
0.00
-0.13

26

Table 8. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Model Variables (Continued)

1.00
-0.03

27
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Table 9. Data and Sensitivity Analysis
DV: Log(lImport)
Hypothesis

Model 1

R-squared

0.707

F-statistics

268.3

GDP(Log)

1.036

GDPpercapita(Iog)

-0.197

RGEI

HI

0.162
0.203

Model 2

0.673

t
t
t
t
t

243.1
0.942
0.212

t
t
t

Model 3a

Model 3

Model 3c

Model 3d

(0.50SD)

(0.75SD)

(1.00SD)

(1.50SD)

0.701

0.702

0.702

0.704

184.7
0.948
0.140

t
t
***

182.7
0.954
0.106

PGEI

HI

ABSGAP

H3

RulRul

H4,H5

0.710

RulRel

H2

0.637

RulFam

H6

-0.347

RelRula

H2

0.645

RelRel

H4

0.906

RelFam

H6

-0.379

FamRul

H6

-0.541

***

-0.607

FamRel

H6

-1.085

t

-1.140

FamFam

H5, H6

-1.380

f

-1.350

0.783

t
t

0.789

Language

t
t
**

186.0

f

187.9

t

0.972

t
*

0.966

t

t
t

1.672

f

1.536

f

0.070

0.102 ***

0.012

0.850

Religion

0.519

RBritish Colony

-0.133

R Spanish_Colony

-0.488

PBritishCotony

-0.212

PSpanishColony

-0.215

EU27

0.652

Border

1.292

Reporterlsland

-0.232

PartnerTsland

-0.491

ReporterLandlock

-0.996

t
t

0.962
0.475

t
t

***
t
*

PartnerLandlock

-2.199

t
t
t

Distance

-0.0001

f

-0.712

t

0.048

-0.455

0.551
0.803

0.528

-0.137

**
**
**
t
t
t
t
t

0.004

**

-0.513

0.997

0.630
0.799
-0.528
-0.541

0.151

**
**
**
***

t
**

-0.145
-0.565 ***
f

-1.532

t

0.763

t
t
t

-1.636

0.726

t

0.567

f

0.543

f

-1.134
-1.588

-0.004

***

1.160
0.848

-0.484

0.046

***

-0.580

t

-0.101

-0.087

-0.203

-0.173

-0.308 **

-0.191

1.211

t
t

0.706
1.124
-0.311

-0.354

**

-0.540

-0.865

-0.0001

t
t
t

-1.023

-2.163

-0.202

1.112

-0.102

***

-0.165

0.777

t
t

-0.129

-0.517

1.214

0.857

-0.530

-0.018

0.111

***
**

0.512

t
***
**
***
**

***
t
**

0.851
1.170
-0.268

t
t
t

-1.024

-0.0001 t

-0.0001

-2.325

-0.527

-2.290

t
t
**
t
t
t
t

0.926
1.157
-0.256
-0.518
-1.016
-2.271
-0.0001

f
t
**
t
t
t
t

1.106

t

1.029

f

-0.171
-0.413 ***
-0.942

t

-2.247

f

-0.0001 t

fPO.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1
a Code: Exporter-Importer, for example, RelRul means trade flows from relation-based to rulebased countries
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Table 10. Classification and Comparison of Foreign Investment of Different Countries
FDI ($billions)
Category
Rule-based
Relation-based
Neither-based
Total

N
20
6
13
39

Mean
1.42
1.51
1.43
1.44

S.D.
1.72
2.21
2.18
1.90

FDI/FI (%)
Mean
47.19
81.79
86.92
65.76

S.D.
27.14
15.29
19.97
30.00
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Table 11. Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Variable
FDI

FDI_FI
CAPGDP

CAP

GEI
Rul
Rel
Fam
ENGJLAW

FRELAW

GERLAW

SCAJLAW

GDP
FXRT

AGE

Data Source
Cumulative foreign direct
investment (FDI) (billions of US$)
(2005-2007 average).
FDI as % of total foreign
investment.
Market capitalization of listed
companies as % of GDP (20052007 average).
Market capitalization of listed
companies (billions of US$) (20052007 average).
Governance Environment Index.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country is rule-based.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country is relation-based.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country is neither-based.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country's legal system originated in
the English common law tradition
(1998).
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country's legal system originated in
the French civil law tradition (1998).
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country's legal system originated in
the German civil law tradition
(1998).
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a
country's legal system originated in
the Scandinavian civil law tradition
(1998).
Gross domestic product (billions of
US$) (2005-2007 average).
Change in foreign exchange rate
(local currency per US$), 20042007. A positive FXRT means that
the local currency is rising against
the U.S. dollar.
The number of years the stock

Variable Description
International Financial Statistics
(IFS) (IMF, 2009).
IFS.
World Development Indicators
(WDI) World Bank (2008).
WDI.

Li (2009).
Li (2009).
Li (2009).
Li (2009).
La Porta et al. (1998).

La Porta etal. (1998).

La Porta etal. (1998).

La Porta etal. (1998).

IFS.
WDI.

International Encyclopedia of the

87
market had been in existence as of
2006.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if
none of the following foreign
investment restrictions are in place:
(1) ceiling on the percentage of
foreign ownership in a particular
stock, (2) restrictions on the
repatriation of income and earned
interest, or (3)direct controls
preventing entry of foreign investors
into the market.
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if the

Stock Market
(Sheimo, Loizou, and Aves, 1999).
OECD's FDI regulatory
restrictiveness index: revision and
extension to more economies
(OECD, 2006), Implementing the eAPEC Strategy: progress and
recommendations for further action
(Lee, 2004) and country reports
(UNCTAD for multiple years)
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0.208
2.25*
39

9.092f
0.020
-0.130
1.009
1.828**
0.979
2.994
0.233*
-2.111**

(0.976)
(0.131)
(0.119)
(0.967)
(0.815)
(1.415)
(1.812)
(0.136)
(0.774)
(0.121)
(0.954)
(0.826)
(1.413)
(1.722)
(0.138)
(0.756)
(0.957)
(0.812)

-0.137
0.886
1.801**
0.837
2.847
0.246*
-2.103***
-0.163
-0.448

0.189
1.984*
39

(1.040)

9.261f

Model 2
Log(FDI)

0.684
10.159f
39

54.208**
-6.826f
-0.609
0.424
-9.197
-15.197
-1.565
3.369**
-5.519
0.609
(17.000)
(1.157)
(1.072)
(8.694)
(7.775)
(12.591)
(16.708)
(1.254)
(7.634)
(1.612)

Model 3
FDI FI

PO.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1; Std. Errors are in the parenthesis.

R-Square(%)
F-Value
N of countries

DV
Ivs
(Constant)
GEI
FXRATE
ENG_LAW
FRE_LAW
GER_LAW
SCA_LAW
Log(GDP)
Open
Log(FDI)
Rel
Fam
Rul

Model 1
Log(FDI)

0.805
16.640f
39

0.541
-3.756
-8.809
-15.713
-16.064
1.391
-10.955**
1.362
39.532f
45.371f
(0.846)
(6.644)
(6.120)
(9.758)
(12.365)
(0.997)
(5.840)
(1.275)
(6.573)
(5.606)

(13.798)

Model 4
FDI FI
36.634**

Table 13. Data Analysis Results of FDI Hypotheses

0.805
16.640f
39

5.840
-39.532f

0.541
-3.756
-8.809
-15.713
-16.064
1.391
-10.955**
1.362

76.166t

(6.752)
(6.573)

(0.846)
(6.644)
(6.120)
(9.758)
(12.365)
(0.997)
(5.840)
(1.275)

(14.092)

Model 4a
FDI _FI
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0.172
2.088*
43

R-Square(%)
F-Value
N of countries

(0.844)
(0.140)
(0.005)
(1.059)
(0.885)
(1.430)
(1.928)
(0.145)
(2.304)
(0.004)
(1.041)
(0.884)
(1.423)
(1.738)
(0.147)
(2.296)
(1.031)
(0.849)

-0.003
2.668**
2.075**
2.394
3.356*
0.275*
-5.158**
-0.323
0.819
0.178
2.012*
43

(0.905)

1.372

Model6
Log(CAP)

(48.612)

537.536|

0.821
28.525f
43

(14.485)
(2.950)
(0.096)
(22.472)
(18.701)
(29.500)
(40.557)

Model 7
CAP GDP
50.174**
5.060*
-0.054
71.585***
22.453
70.459**
43.544

PO.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1; Std. Errors are in the parenthesis.

1.440*
-0.076
-0.002
2.519**
2.063**
2.267
3.497*
0.287*
-5.014**

DV
IVs
(Constant)
GEI
AGE
ENG_LAW
FREJLAW
GER_LAW
SCA_LAW
Log(GDP)
Dhk
Rel
Fam

Model 5
Log(CAP)

Table 14. Data Analysis Results of Stock Market Hypotheses

0.826
25.977f
43

535.417f
-40.384*
-33.383*

-0.033
78.386***
24.316
67.523**
57.279

62.908***

(47.832)
(21.426)
(17.504)

(0.089)
(21.836)
(18.459)
(29.202)
(36.107)

(16.741)

Model 8
CAP GDP

90

0.138
1.936*
42

R-Square(%)
F-Value
N of countries

Model 7
CAP GDP

Model 8
CAP GDP

0.145
1.867*
42

0.362
4.885**
42

0.381
4.610***
42

(0.844) 1.372 (0.905) 50.174** (14.485) 62.908*** (16.741)
(0.140)
5.060*
(2.950)
(0.005) -0.003 (0.004) -0.054
(0.096)
-0.033
(0.089)
(1.059) 2.668** (1.041) 71.585** (22.472) 78.386*** (21.836)
(0.885) 2.075** (0.884) 22.453 (18.701)
24.316
(18.459)
(1.430) 2.394 (1.423) 70.459** (29.500) 67.523** (29.202)
(1.928) 3.355* (1.738) 43.544 (40.557)
59.279
(36.107)
(0.145) 0.275* (0.147)
-0.323 (1.031)
-40.384* (21.426)
0.819 (0.849)
-33.383* (17.504)

Model6
Log(CAP)

PO.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1; Std. Errors are in the parenthesis.

1.440*
-0.076
-0.002
2.519**
2.063**
2.266
3.497*
0.287*

(Constant)
GEI
AGE
Eng_law
Fre_law
Ger_law
Sca_law
Log(GDP)
Rel
Fam

IVs

DV

Model 5
Log(CAP)

Table 15. Data Analysis Results of Stock market Hypotheses (Without Hong Kong)
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Generalized Trust

High
Public
Ordering
Low

High
Rule-based
governance
environment

Particularized trust
Extended

Nuclear

Relation-Based
governance
environment

Neither-Based
governance
environment

Figure 1: Typology of Governance Environments
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Average
governance cost

0

Rule-based
.governance

Relation-based
governance

Turning point

Extent of Market

Figure 2: The governance cost of rule-based and relation-based systems
(Source: Li (1999))
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Transaction cost

Rule

High

Low

Rule-based

Small scale

Large scale

Relationbased

Large Scale

Small scale

Neither-based

Limited scale

Institution
Lack of
rule

Figure 3: The Combination of Institutional Theory and Transaction Costs Economics
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Particularized
Trust

Rule-based
Governance
environment

P3, P4 +
International trade

Non-rule-based
•
•

Foreign Portfolio investment

Relation-based
Neither-based

Figure 4: Theoretical framework
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